Regulation

The Other Problem with Airline Mergers

A proposed acquisition of Hawaiian Airlines by Alaska Airlines would be bad news for those traveling between the U.S. mainland and Hawaii. The combined company would have a huge share of that market and would thus be in a position to keep fares sky high.

Another negative feature of the deal is that it would enhance the position of a company with a checkered regulatory compliance record. As shown in Violation Tracker, Alaska Air and its subsidiaries have been cited more than 200 times by the Federal Aviation Administration for a variety of safety violations involving issues such as maintenance, hazardous waste and security practices.

All the airlines have such violations, and the larger carriers have been fined more times, reflecting their wider operations. But in relation to its size, Alaska Air’s record is worse than that of its counterparts. Its total of 220 FAA violations is not far behind that of Southwest’s total of 270, even though Southwest carries about four times as many passengers.

Alaska Air’s violations also tend to be more serious. Its 220 cases have generated more than $10 million in fines (the FAA’s penalty structure is not very onerous), while the total from the 539 fines paid by the much larger Delta Air Lines is below $9 million. (All the FAA statistics are limited to cases with fines of at least $5,000.)

Alaska Air has also racked up a series of penalties from the Transportation Department’s Aviation Consumer Protection Division. Including matters involving Virgin America, which Alaska Air acquired in 2016, there have been 13 of those cases with total fines of $777,500.

Then there is the issue of employment practices. Earlier this year, a federal judge in California ordered Alaska Air to pay nearly $31 million to a class of flight attendants who had sued Virgin for failing to pay proper overtime pay and failing to pay for break time as required under California law. The workers originally won $77 million in damages, but the company appealed and got part of the award overturned. Alaska Air also tried to get the U.S. Supreme Court to throw out the rest of the award but the high court declined to hear the case. The matter thus went back to the trial court, where the judge settled on the $31 million payout.

Hawaiian Airlines has a somewhat less egregious regulatory track record. It has been fined 31 times by the FAA and five times by the Transportation Department’s consumer division. There is every reason to suspect that if the merger goes through, its compliance practices would come to look more like that of its new parent.

When antitrust regulators review a proposed merger, they have to give primary consideration to the potential market impacts. Yet it is also worth keeping in mind that as companies grow larger, they often tend to become less mindful of safety matters and other regulatory obligations. Or if they already have a lax approach to compliance, that problem is likely to become worse. All this is just one more reason bigger is usually not better.

Getting Tougher on Product Safety

For most of its history, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has not been the most aggressive federal regulator. Created in 1972, the agency has depended primarily on voluntary recalls of dangerous products by manufacturers. Its budget is below $200 million and its staff numbers around 500, both tiny by DC standards.

While the CPSC has the ability to use monetary penalties when companies fail to disclose hazards, it is relatively restrained in its use of that power. As shown in Violation Tracker, the agency has imposed a total of $397 million in fines against companies since 2000. More than half of that total has come since the Biden Administration took office. By comparison, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which started operating in 2011, has racked up more than $17 billion in fines and settlements.

For all these reasons, it is significant that the CPSC and the Justice Department recently announced that a federal jury in Los Angeles had returned a guilty verdict in the first-ever criminal prosecution brought against corporate executives under the Consumer Product Safety Act.

The defendants in the case were the chief administrative officer and the chief executive officer of Gree USA, Inc., a subsidiary of the Chinese-owned Hong Kong Gree Electric Appliances Sales Co., Ltd. The two men were charged with deliberately withholding information about defective dehumidifiers that could catch fire and selling these units with false certification marks that the products met applicable safety standards. They were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the CPSC and failure to meet reporting requirements, though they were acquitted of wire fraud.

Gree itself has also been targeted by the CPSC. The company has paid more in fines to the CPSC than any other company over the past two decades. That includes a $91 million penalty that was by far the largest single fine brought by the agency during this period. It was also the first criminal enforcement action under the Consumer Product Safety Act.

The impact of that was softened by the decision of the Justice Department to offer Gree a leniency deal in the form of a deferred prosecution agreement by which the company was able to avoid pleading guilty to the charges.

On the other hand, DOJ and CPSC took the bold step of going after the two Gree officials individually. It took four years from the time the two men were indicted, but their conviction sends a powerful message to executives that they can be held personally responsible for brazen disregard of product risks. The Gree executives are scheduled to be sentenced next March and could receive up to five years in prison.

The debate over how to deal with corporate crime is often framed as a choice between penalizing the company and prosecuting executives. The Gree case shows the value of using both approaches at the same time. That makes it more likely the message will get through to everyone in a rogue company that it has to change its practices in a fundamental way.

The CFPB Fights On

The Washington Post recently published a long examination of the obstacles facing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in its effort to rein in payday lenders which prey on low-income families. The leading companies in the industry have managed to block various investigations of their practices.

The agency’s difficulties mainly stem from a lawsuit brought by financial industry groups challenging the way in which the CFPB is funded. It is based on disingenuous arguments about the separation of power between the executive branch and Congress. The case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard oral arguments last month but has not yet issued a ruling.

The good news is that the CFPB, which is no stranger to opposition from powerful corporate and Congressional foes, is not backing down. While the payday lending cases may be stalled, the agency is aggressively targeting other bad actors.

Last month, the CFPB fined the credit reporting giant TransUnion $23 million for violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to ensure the accuracy of the information it supplies to landlords for screening of tenant applications. Last week, the agency fined Citibank over $25 million for intentionally discriminating against Armenian Americans in reviewing credit card applications and then lying to those applicants about the reason for the denial.

In its latest action, the CFPB goes after the online lender Enova International Inc. for what the agency calls “widespread illegal conduct including withdrawing funds from customers’ bank accounts without their permission, making deceptive statements about loans, and cancelling loan extensions.”

This is not the first time the CFPB has targeted Enova. In 2019 it fined the company $3.2 million for many of the same practices. That penalty apparently did not get Enova to change its ways. The CFPB found that more than 100,000 customers have been subjected to abuses during the past four years.

To its credit, the CFPB is not just issuing another cease-and-desist order and imposing a larger fine ($15 million) this time around. It is also restricting some of Enova’s business and putting a crimp in the wallets of the company’s top managers.

Specifically, the CFPB is banning Enova for a period of seven years from offering or providing closed-end consumer loans that must be substantially repaid within 45 days. It is also requiring the company to reform its executive pay practices so that compensation is determined in part by compliance with federal consumer financial law.

This approach of restricting a rogue corporation’s business is potentially more effective than simply upping the fine. The same goes for making top executives personally feel some financial pain as a result of their failure to end the misconduct.

In its dozen years of existence, the CFPB has an impressive track record of policing misconduct in the financial services sector. As shown in Violation Tracker, it has imposed more than $17 billion in penalties against miscreants large and small. Let’s hope it is able to go on performing this essential mission.

The Missing Crackdown

Joe Biden came to office vowing to get tough on corporate abuses, reversing the soft-on-white-collar-crime approach of his predecessor. Biden went on making those promises, and they were echoed by Attorney General Garland and other Justice Department officials.

That crackdown, however, has not materialized. A new report from Public Citizen shows that the Justice Department concluded only 110 corporate criminal prosecutions in 2022—lower than in any year of the Trump Administration. In fact, it was the smallest number since 1994.

In addition to the decline in overall cases, Public Citizen points out a drop in the number of those cases in which the defendant company received a leniency deal. These are arrangements known as non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements in which a firm can avoid a guilty plea by paying a penalty and promising to change its behavior.

Those pledges are frequently broken, and the companies are charged again. Instead of throwing the book at these recidivists, DOJ often offers them a new leniency agreement, making the whole process a farce.

As Public Citizen notes, a decline in leniency agreements would be a good thing if it went along with an increase in the overall volume of prosecutions. Instead of replacing leniency agreements with conventional cases, the DOJ statistics suggest that the agency is simply choosing not to prosecute at all in many instances.

Public Citizen says DOJ may be making greater use of a process called declination, which is essentially a form of super-leniency in which no charges are brought. Some of these deals are made public, but the best corporate defense lawyers can negotiate declinations that are kept secret.

The analysis done by Public Citizen focuses on criminal cases. I decided to check comparable civil cases brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. According to data collected in Violation Tracker, the SEC collected $1.4 billion in penalties from companies in 2021. This was down from the totals in the final two years of the Trump Administration. In 2022 the SEC’s total jumped to $4.4 billion, thanks in large part to a single case involving a $1 billion settlement with the German insurance company Allianz.

This year the SEC total through mid-October is $1.5 billion. Unless the agency announces some very large cases in the next nine weeks, its 2023 total will also fall behind the final Trump years.

While case and penalty totals do not tell the whole story, what we see in both the criminal and civil areas is something less than a major assault on corporate misconduct. There have been some laudable steps taken by other agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, but both of those regulators have faced legal challenges to their enforcement powers. At the same time, the whole system of business regulation is threatened by Republican defunding efforts.

Overall, the Biden Administration has yet to show that it can overcome these obstacles and make good on the promises of a crackdown on rogue corporations.

The Corn Dust Conspiracy

About 5,000 workers are killed on the job in the United States each year. Some of these are pure accidents, while others may result from a lapse in safety procedures. Most disturbing are those caused by a failure on the part of management to rectify known hazards.

Solidly in the latter category is the wrongdoing attributed to Didion Milling. In 2017 a dust explosion at a corn mill operated by the company in Cambria, Wisconsin killed five workers and seriously injured others. Six years later, corporate officials whose actions contributed to the disaster and then concealed its causes are finally being held to account.

A federal jury recently convicted Didion’s Vice President of Operations, Derrick Clark, of conspiring to falsify documents, making false environmental compliance certifications and obstructing the Occupational Safety and Health investigation of the explosion. Shawn Mesner, former food safety superintendent at the plant, was convicted of conspiring to obstruct and mislead OSHA by falsifying sanitation records concerning the accumulation of corn dust at the mill.

In other words, Clark and Mesner were found to have covered up dangerous conditions before the explosion and then engaged in a cover-up after the fact. They did not act alone. Three other company officials previously pleaded guilty to related charges. A sixth official was acquitted.

The company was also prosecuted. Last month it pleaded guilty to falsifying records related to its Occupational Safety and Health Act and Clean Air Act obligations. Although Didion has not yet been formally sentenced, it has agreed to pay $1 million in criminal fines and $10.25 million in restitution to the victims of the accident and their families.

The Didion case exemplifies some harsh realities about U.S. workplace practices.

First, it demonstrates the willingness of some employers to put the lives of their workers at risk to boost their bottom line. It is no secret that corn dust is highly combustible and needs to be reduced through careful sanitary practices. Didion and its managers decided to sidestep these practices and instead falsify records to conceal their reckless behavior.

Second, it illustrates the myth of over-regulation. The Didion facility had been cited by OSHA for dust explosion hazards six years prior to the explosion. In 2011 it was fined all of $6,300—which it negotiated down to $3,465. It appears that Didion then began keeping false records while OSHA was kept in the dark about the increasingly dangerous conditions at the mill.

Third, it shows how the country has become blasé about both workplace hazards and the difficulties faced by an over-extended OSHA to do anything about them. I find it remarkable that the Didion accident and the subsequent revelations and legal proceedings have received so little coverage outside Wisconsin.

It is true that Didion is not a well-known company, but the story of its egregious behavior needs to be more widely told. This case also deserves more attention in that it is a rare instance in which managers were held personally liable for their efforts to subvert the regulatory system. The sentences they end up receiving will be an indicator of how serious a crime such behavior is considered to be—and how much we value the lives of workers.

The Donald Trumps of the Corporate World

There is a word, recidivists, for those who repeatedly commit crimes. But there is no term, as far as I know, for those who commit the greatest variety of offenses.

If we are talking about public figures, the term should probably be Trumpist—given that the former president has racked up an unprecedented assortment of legal entanglements that continue to grow. But what about corporations? Which companies have engaged in the widest range of misconduct?

To answer this question, I drilled down into the data collected in Violation Tracker. The database tags each of its more than 500,000 entries with one of eight broad offense groups: competition-related offenses; consumer-protection-related offenses; employment-related offenses; environment-related offenses; financial offenses; government-contracting-related offenses; healthcare-related offenses; and safety-related offenses. These, in turn, are divided into a total of nearly 100 more specific offense types.

I set out to discover whether any of the more than 3,000 parent companies for which we aggregate data are linked to cases in every one of the eight offense groups. It turns out that 13 parents meet that criterion, but if we look only at those with substantial penalties—over $1 million—in each category, the list narrows down to five corporations. These include one freight giant (United Parcel Service), two major pharmacy chains (CVS Health and Walgreens Boots Alliance) and two large drugmakers (Bristol-Myers Squibb and Merck).

Among the wide-ranging rap sheets of these five companies, the one that stands out is that linked to Merck. It has the largest cumulative penalty total dating back to 2000: more than $10 billion. That includes ten-figure totals in three offense groups: financial, healthcare-related and safety-related.

Merck has achieved its position as the Donald Trump of the business world as a result of 86 entries in Violation Tracker. Chief among its safety-related cases is the $4.9 billion it paid to settle multi-district litigation brought by thousands of plaintiffs claiming the company’s heavily promoted anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx caused injury or death. The Vioxx scandal was also at the center of the company’s biggest penalty in the healthcare-related category, a $950 million settlement of civil and criminal charges brought by the U.S. Justice Department, as well as several consumer protection cases.

As for financial offenses, Merck had to pay over $2 billion to settle tax issues brought by the Internal Revenue Service. Merck’s government-contracting-related cases include a $650 million False Claims Act case involving improper kickbacks to healthcare providers to get them to prescribe its medications.

Merck’s competition-related penalties include a $60 million settlement by its subsidiary Schering-Plough of allegations it improperly blocked the introduction of a lower-cost alternative to one of its products. In the environmental area, Merck has paid over $33 million in penalties in nearly three dozen federal and state enforcement actions.

Finally, Merck’s record of employment-related offenses includes eleven cases dealing with retirement plan administration, gender discrimination and violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act.

One thing that can be said in Merck’s defense is that few of its penalties are from the past few years, indicating that it may be trying to improve its compliance. It’s a different story with CVS and Walgreens. Since the beginning of 2020, Walgreens has paid penalties more than two dozen times, while CVS has done so in 69 cases. Both are involved in pending multistate lawsuits relating to their role in the opioid crisis, so their penalty totals are likely to go on growing.

Companies that have paid multiple penalties in multiple categories exemplify misconduct that is not compartmentalized but instead can be found throughout a firm’s operations. Regulators and prosecutors need to do more to get these corporations to clean up their act across the board.

The Big and the Bad

Proposed new guidelines on merger enforcement just released by the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department are a welcome development. In many industries, takeovers have put U.S. consumers at the mercy of a small number of mega-corporations all too willing to use their market power aggressively.

DOJ and FTC have put forth 13 guidelines under which the agencies could block mergers that eliminate substantial competition, increase concentration, entrench or extend a dominant position and so forth. Mergers that substantially lessen competition for workers could also be targeted.

Along with the market benefits that would come from slowing consolidation (reduction in the number of firms in an industry) and concentration (increase in the share of business activity controlled by a small number of large firms), this new aggressive posture could also help to restrain the growth of corporate misconduct.

The reason is that as corporations grow larger and more dominant they seem to become more inclined to break the rules—not only the rules against price-fixing but also those concerning labor standards, environmental protection, transportation safety and much more. Evidence for this can be found in the data collected in Violation Tracker.

A prime example is the financial services sector. The country’s four largest banks—JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo—account for $180 billion in cumulative penalties since 2000. This is nearly half of the penalties paid by all of the 330 parent companies in this sector covered by Violation Tracker.

Penalty concentration is even greater in the petroleum industry, where the top five oil companies—Exxon Mobil, Shell, Chevron, BP and ConocoPhillips—are responsible for cumulative penalties of $42 billion. That is three-quarters of the $55 billion paid by all the companies in the sector.

Big Tech giants Meta Platforms, Alphabet and Microsoft have cumulative penalties of $9 billion, which is 60 percent of the total paid by entire the information technology sector. (This excludes Amazon.com, which is categorized in Violation Tracker as a retailer, and Apple Inc., which is put in the electronics category.)

Tyson Foods, JBS (the Brazilian parent of Swift and Pilgrim’s Pride), and WH Group (the Chinese parent of Smithfield Foods), which dominate meat and poultry processing, account for $1 billion in penalties, while leading packaged food companies PepsiCo, Mondelez International, Kraft Heinz and ConAgra account for another $435 million. Together they are responsible for about 40 percent of the $3.7 billion in penalties paid by the food products sector overall.

In other industries such as motor vehicles and airlines there are few significant companies, so penalties are also highly concentrated among them.

This is not to say that mega-corporations have a monopoly on misconduct. Many of the more than 500,000 cases documented in Violation Tracker involve small firms.

Yet their misdeeds usually have a limited impact, whereas the transgressions of the godzillas of the business world cause the most harm to workers, consumers and communities. Preventing large companies from becoming even larger and more dominant will help limit these harms.

More Compliance Officers, Less Compliance

It appears these are boom times for corporate compliance officers. According to an article in Law360, a recent survey by the recruiting firm BarkerGilmore found that that “the demand for compliance talent is higher than ever because of an evolving list of new requirements like environmental, social and governance programs; enterprise risk management and new work culture brought on by post-pandemic norms.” Pay is also rising rapidly for these officers.

This is all good news for those who want to make a career of helping corporations deal with government regulations, but what does it mean for compliance itself? Does the inclination of big business to spend more on this function indicate that corporate behavior is improving?

Based on the data collected in Violation Tracker, that does not seem to be the case. Fines and settlements in the U.S. in 2022 climbed to over $69 billion, the highest annual total in seven years. Over the entire span of time covered by the database, which extends back to 2000, the only higher totals occurred in the mid-2010s, when the annual tallies reached as high as $77 billion due to giant settlements by the likes of BP in connection with the Deepwater Horizon disaster and by the major banks in connection with the mortgage and toxic securities crises.

Last year also saw a jump in the average penalty paid per case. That figure was $2.5 million, up from $2 million the year before. Aside from the $2.9 million average in 2020, last year’s amount was the highest since 2015.

Another indicator that 2022 was a banner year for penalties can be seen in the number of individual parent companies which paid a massive amount–$100 million or more–in fines and settlements. Sixty-three parents gained that dubious distinction, the highest number since 2015.

Included in that group were eleven companies with penalties of $1 billion or more: Allianz, Walgreens Boots Alliance, CVS Health, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Wells Fargo, Walmart, AbbVie, Danske Bank, Navient, Bayer and Glencore.

What does it say that penalties are accelerating at the same time that corporations are purportedly putting more resources into compliance? One possibility is that the increasing use of compliance officers is merely window dressing, a gesture meant to satisfy investors concerned about social responsibility. These officers may have little power and influence. They can warn managers about regulatory risks but may have little ability to change behavior that is illicit but profitable.

A more charitable interpretation would be that compliance officers are bringing more violations to light by encouraging companies to self-report infractions. This, in turn, could contribute to increases in overall penalty levels.

This would be a hopeful sign if it meant that companies were at the same time cleaning up their behavior. The problem is that recidivism shows no signs of receding. Year after year, most large companies go on breaking the rules and treating penalties as an affordable cost of doing business as usual.

If compliance officers could do something about that, they would truly be earning their rising pay.

Wells Fargo Pays More for Its Sins

When the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau announced in 2016 that it was fining Wells Fargo $100 million for creating fee-generating customer accounts without permission, bank executives may have thought they could simply pay the penalty and move on.

Instead, Wells has had to contend with a series of regulatory and legal consequences. The latest is a $1 billion settlement the bank has just agreed to pay to resolve a class action lawsuit brought by shareholders accusing it of misrepresenting the progress it had made in improving its internal controls and compliance practices. The deal ranks among the largest securities settlements of all time.

In between the initial CFPB action and the new lawsuit resolution, Wells confronted the following:

In 2018 the Federal Reserve forced out several board members and took the unusual step of barring Wells from growing in size until it improved its compliance. It is telling that the asset cap is still in place.
That same year, Wells paid $575 million to settle litigation over the bogus accounts brought by state attorneys general.
In 2020 the U.S. Justice Department announced that Wells would pay $3 billion to resolve potential criminal and civil liability, but the bank was allowed to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement rather than having to plead guilty. The Trump DOJ also declined to bring charges against any individual executives.

While the monetary penalties paid by Wells are not trivial, they are far from punishing for an institution with nearly $2 trillion in assets and $13 billion in annual profits. They also do not seem to have had much of a deterrent effect.

In 2022 the CFPB took new action against the bank, compelling it to pay a $1.7 billion penalty and provide $2 billion in redress to customers to resolve allegations that it engaged in a variety of new misconduct. Wells was found to have repeatedly misapplied loan payments, wrongfully foreclosed on homes, improperly repossessed vehicles, and incorrectly assessed interest and fees, including surprise overdraft charges. Some 16 million customer accounts were said to have been cheated one way or another.

That 2020 deferred prosecution agreement means that Wells has in effect been on probation. Why, in light of the CFPB case, has the bank not been found to be in violation of that agreement? Is it simply because Wells is now focusing its alleged misconduct on real accounts rather than the fake ones it had been creating? That would be like letting a mugger off the hook for using a knife rather than gun.

Not only should Wells have its probation revoked, but it should undergo something analogous to what the FDIC does when a bank is in financial disarray. Federal regulators should find Wells to be in ethical disarray and take it over while fundamental changes are made to bring it back to some semblance of compliance.

The alternative is letting a rogue institution continue to prey on its customers in any way it can.

A Marriage of Two Tainted Banks

The acquisition of struggling Credit Suisse by its rival UBS may calm the international banking waters, but it will do nothing to improve the compliance profile of the Swiss financial services sector. That’s because both Credit Suisse and UBS have seriously tainted records. Combining them will simply put all those problems under one roof.

Let’s start with Credit Suisse. Its problems extend back at least to the late 1980s, when it was named as one of the banks that allegedly laundered money for a Turkish-Lebanese drug ring. Credit Suisse also played a role in the Reagan Administration’s Iran/Contra scandal.

In the 1990s Credit Suisse was one of the Swiss banks sued in the United States by relatives of Holocaust victims who had been unable to access assets held by the banks for decades. There were also charges that the banks profited by receiving deposits of funds that had been looted by the Nazis. In 1998 the banks agreed to pay a total of $1.25 billion in restitution. The judge in the case later accused the banks of stonewalling in paying out the settlement.

After it acquired a controlling interest in First Boston in the late 1980s and formed CS First Boston, Credit Suisse ended up with more U.S. legal entanglements. CSFB was a target of U.S. divestment activists in the early 1990s because of Credit Suisse’s operations in apartheid-era South Africa. Later that decade, it was one of the investment banks sued for their role in the 1994 bankruptcy of California’s Orange County. In 1998 CSFB agreed to pay $870,000 to settle SEC charges of having misled investors in Orange County bonds and then settled a suit brought against it by the county for $52.5 million.

In 2003, CSFB was one of ten major investment firms that agreed to pay a total of $1.4 billion to settle federal and state charges involving conflicts of interest between their research and investment banking activities. CSFB’s share was $200 million.

In 2009 Credit Suisse agreed to forfeit $268 million to the United States and $268 million to the New York County District Attorney’s Office to resolve criminal charges that it violated economic sanctions in its dealings with customers from countries such as Iran and Sudan.

In 2014 the U.S. Justice Department fined Credit Suisse $1.1 billion and ordered it to pay $666 million in restitution to the IRS after the bank pleaded guilty to charges of conspiring to help U.S. customers evade taxes through the use of offshore accounts.

In 2017 the Justice Department announced a $5.3 billion settlement with Credit Suisse concerning its marketing of toxic mortgage-backed securities a decade earlier. The settlement included a $2.5 billion civil penalty and $2.8 billion in relief to distressed homeowners and affected communities.

Credit Suisse has paid hundreds of millions more in penalties in other cases involving foreign bribery, foreign exchange market manipulation, defrauding investors and much more. Its penalty total in Violation Tracker is more than $11 billion.

And the scandals continue. For example, Credit Suisse is currently embroiled in a corruption case involving the tuna fishing industry in Mozambique.

UBS has a record that is no better. Union Bank of Switzerland and Swiss Bank Corporation, which merged in 1998 to form UBS, were both involved in that same money laundering scandal with Credit Suisse. They were both also embroiled in controversies over investments in South Africa and their polices regarding the accounts of Holocaust victims.

UBS also entered the U.S. market (through the purchase of PaineWebber) and was implicated in the conflict-of-interest scandals. It, too, was prosecuted by the Justice Department for conspiring to aid tax evasion, paying $780 million in penalties.

In 2008 UBS agreed to buy back $11 billion in securities and pay $150 million in penalties as part of the resolution of multi-state litigation alleging it misled customers in the marketing and sale of auction rate securities.

It has paid hundreds of millions more in fines and settlements in cases dealing with financial market manipulation and other offenses. Including that $11 billion securities buyback, its Violation Tracker penalty total is over $17 billion.

In short, the marriage of UBS and Credit Suisse will bring together two banks with highly problematic records. The combined company should work not only to help stabilize financial markets but also to address its legacy of misconduct.