Accounting Standards

Corrupt Watchdogs

At first glance it seemed to be a satirical piece from The Onion. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued a press release announcing that Big Four accounting firm Ernst & Young was being fined $100 million for failing to prevent its audit professionals from cheating on ethics exams required to obtain and maintain their CPA licenses.

Not only did EY exercise poor oversight over its employees—it also tried to withhold evidence of the misconduct from agency investigators. This prompted the SEC to impose the largest fine ever against an audit firm.

The SEC’s release quoted Enforcement Division Director Gurbir Grewal as saying “it’s simply outrageous that the very professionals responsible for catching cheating by clients cheated on ethics exams, of all things,” adding: “And it’s equally shocking that Ernst & Young hindered our investigation of this misconduct.”

Yes, it’s shocking, shocking in a Casablanca sort of way to learn that EY management is apparently as corrupt as its auditors. The SEC failed to mention that EY has a long track record of misconduct. Even before this latest case, it has racked up more than $350 million in fines and settlements since 2000, as documented in Violation Tracker.

In 2013, for instance, EY paid $123 million to resolve allegations that it promoted a tax shelter scheme to clients that was so dodgy that the IRS asked the Justice Department to bring criminal charges against the firm. In 2009 EY paid $109 million to the Michigan Attorney General to settle allegations that it failed to expose accounting fraud in its audits of HealthSouth Corporation.

The SEC itself fined EY eight previous times in the past two decades, including a case last year in which the firm paid $10 million to settle allegations it violated auditor independence rules.

EY is not the only member of the Big Four with a checkered record—they are all tainted. As shown in Violation Tracker, PricewaterhouseCoopers has accumulated $114 million in penalties, Deloitte has $260 million and KPMG a whopping $560 million.

A big portion of the KPMG total came from a 2005 case in which it paid $456 million to resolve criminal charges that it designed and marketed fraudulent tax shelters. It has paid penalties to the SEC nine times since 2000—including a $50 million fine involving the same kind of cheating found at EY.

Given the ineffective deterrent effects of monetary penalties and criminal charges resolved through non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, one might ask whether there is any way to eliminate corruption among the big auditing firms.

The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a federal entity called the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which is supposed to keep auditing firms on the straight and narrow. It has brought more than 100 cases against the Big Four and smaller firms, yet auditing scandals continue to happen.

There is a need to find ways to end the stranglehold the Big Four have on providing auditing services for large corporations. This could include reforms such as stricter requirements for companies to rotate the firms they use. New reforms adopted in the UK will require large corporations to use smaller firms for at least a portion of their auditing.

A bolder approach could involve the creation of non-profit auditing agencies with more rigorous independence rules to prevent them from being influenced by unscrupulous clients. These and other reforms are urgently needed to end a system in which auditors who are supposed to ferret out corruption instead end up facilitating it.

Note: Just before the EY case was announced, Violation Tracker posted its latest quarterly update with about 10,000 new federal, state and local regulatory enforcement actions and class action lawsuits. This brought the total number of entries to 522,000 and total penalties to $804 billion. The EY case will be added soon.

Business Fights FASB on Corporate Welfare Disclosure

Large corporations spend a lot of time complaining about their obligations to government, such as paying taxes and complying with regulations, while saying very little about what they get from taxpayers in the form of financial assistance. The organization that sets corporate accounting standards now wants to see the magnitude of that assistance disclosed in financial statements, and the business world is howling in protest.

In November, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a proposal that would require publicly traded corporations to disclose details on a wide range of government assistance — such as tax incentives, cash grants, and low-interest loans — when that help is the result of an agreement between a public agency and a specific firm, as opposed to provisions in tax codes that any business can claim. The proposal mirrors the one adopted by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) that will require state and local government agencies to disclose the amount of revenue they are losing as a result of tax incentive deals.

The FASB proposal has some flaws, such as the decision not to require companies to provide estimates of the value of multi-year subsidy deals and a lack of clarity on the degree to which the information would have to be disaggregated. Still, it would be a major advance in financial transparency, giving investors and others important information on the extent to which companies are dependent on the public sector.

The business world sees it differently. During a recently completed three-month comment period, about two dozen trade associations and large corporations submitted statements on the proposal that were overwhelmingly negative.

At the center of the backlash are the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, which submitted joint comments arguing that the scope of the accounting standard is “overly broad,” that compliance costs would be “significant,” and that companies could place themselves in “legal jeopardy” by disclosing the information proposed by FASB.

The big-business-sponsored Council on State Taxation also invoked the privacy rights of corporate taxpayers and warned that the disclosures would “assist those who wish to harass a company regarding credits or incentives received pursuant to an economic development agreement.” Similar objections were presented by the American Banking Association, which represents entities that received trillions of dollars in assistance from the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury in the wake of the financial meltdown that some of those same entities brought about.

Perhaps most infuriating are the negative comments submitted by large companies that are among the biggest recipients of public assistance. We know who they are because numerous government agencies already reveal a substantial amount of company-specific subsidy data, which my colleagues and I at Good Jobs First have collected for our Subsidy Tracker search engine. Although we’ve gotten a lot from the agency disclosure, having more information in the financial reports of all public companies would allow us to make Subsidy Tracker even more complete.

Several of the corporations commenting against the FASB rule have received more than $1 billion each in federal, state and local subsidies, including two whose totals put them among the top ten recipients: General Motors ($5.7 billion) and Ford Motor ($4 billion). These totals do not include the tens of billions they received in loans and loan guarantees, whose value after repayments is difficult to calculate.

GM, which survived only after being taken over by the federal government, whines that the FASB disclosure proposal “would be costly and difficult to prepare given the complexity of global entities and the wide variations of such arrangements” and claims that the information could be “misleading” or could benefit “special interest groups questioning tax incentives offered by governments as perceived abuses of the current taxation system.”

In what might be a dig at its competitor, Ford Motor, which did not require a federal takeover, suggests that FASB limit its disclosure requirement to bailouts and exclude “incentives” that are offered in exchange for a commitment to invest or create jobs.

IBM, which has been awarded some $1.4 billion in subsidies, asserts that the costs of the disclosure would outweigh the benefits and says that if FASB moves ahead with the new standard it should “not require disclosure of specific terms and conditions, which may include confidential or proprietary information for both governments and entities.” In other words, make it as vague as possible.

In case there was any doubt, these comments confirm that big business is in favor of transparency only when what is to be disclosed puts a company in a favorable light. Let’s hope FASB stands fast and joins with GASB in bringing corporate welfare out of the shadows.

Toshiba’s Not-Quite-Spotless Track Record

Journalists have traditionally been taught to avoid superlatives and other sweeping statements. Yet the New York Times just made that rookie mistake and ended up publishing an erroneous description of the track record of Toshiba prior to the recently disclosed accounting scandal that has led to the resignation of the top executives of the Japanese electronics giant.

“Toshiba Quickly Loses a Spotless Reputation” was the headline of the print version of the flawed effort by the Times to put the revelations in context. This may be the first case of extensive accounting fraud at the company, but Toshiba’s track record is far from spotless.

For example, like numerous other Japanese manufacturers, Toshiba has been the subject of price-fixing allegations. In 2012 the company paid $21 million to settle a U.S. class action case involving LCD flat panel screens after a jury ruled against the company and awarded $87 million to the plaintiffs. In 2010 Toshiba was fined 17.6 million euros for its role in a case brought by the European Union charging ten producers of memory chips with anti-competitive behavior.

In 1999 Toshiba committed to spend up to $2.1 billion to settle a class-action lawsuit alleging that the company had sold millions of defective laptop computers in the United States. The following year it agreed to pay $33 million to settle claims that it sold substandard equipment to federal agencies.

Going back further, Toshiba was involved in a scandal in 1987 over allegations that one of its subsidiaries violated Western export controls by selling submarine sound-dampening equipment to the Soviet Union. The incident led to resignations of top executives and temporary restrictions on U.S. imports of certain Toshiba products.

The lesson that the Times failed to grasp is that corporate misconduct rarely emerges out of nowhere. In fact, the 300-page report on the accounting scandal prepared by outside lawyers and accountants (the English version of which as of this writing has not been made public) charges that improprieties such as the overstatement of profits had been going on for at least seven years. Given what came to light in the Olympus scandal of a few years back, it is possible that subsequent revelations will show that Toshiba was cooking the books for a much longer period.

One thing that can be said about Japanese corporate scandals is that they usually lead to rapid resignations of top executives. Toshiba is also replacing half the members on its board of directors. Such house cleaning does not always occur at U.S. corporations involved in misconduct cases.

We have examples such as JPMorgan Chase, which has had to pay out billions of dollars to settle a variety of lawsuits and regulatory actions, including a recent one involving manipulation of foreign exchange markets that required the bank to plead guilty to a criminal charge. Throughout this all, Jamie Dimon had remained in place as CEO and, unlike apologetic Japanese executives, has loudly denounced regulators and prosecutors. American business does not believe in shame.

An Indictment of the Financial Sector

The purpose of the traditional blue-ribbon government panel has to been to study a serious problem and issue a report with vague explanations of causes and mushy policy prescriptions. The new report from the federal government’s Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission is a refreshing exception to the rule.

In the place of such nebulous prose, the 600-page-plus document is filled with pointed analyses of who did what wrong when. In other words, it names names. The FCIC acknowledges that it needed to delve into arcane subjects such as securitization and derivatives, but the report’s preface states:

To bring these subjects out of the realm of the abstract, we conducted case study investigations of specific financial firms—and in many cases specific facets of these institutions—that played pivotal roles. Those institutions included American International Group (AIG), Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide Financial, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Moody’s, and Wachovia. We looked more generally at the roles and actions of scores of other companies.

To get a sense of the scope of the rogues’ gallery of financial players, take a look at the report’s index, which, interestingly, is not in the official PDF but can be found on the website of the publisher that is issuing the commercial version. There are dozens of entries for specific firms and even more for specific individuals. Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers, for instance, each have listings for about 40 different pages.

The FCIC does not just mention names; it assigns responsibility and soundly rejects the notion—expressed at commission hearings by major financial industry executives—that the crisis came as a complete surprise:

The crisis was the result of human action and inaction, not of Mother Nature or computer models gone haywire. The captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial system ignored warnings and failed to question, understand, and manage evolving risks within a system essential to the well-being of the American public.

It is satisfying that the report acknowledges the culpability of figures in both the private and the public spheres. Along with Wall Street villains, it fingers government institutions and officials, especially those with regulatory responsibilities:

The sentries were not at their posts, in no small part due to the widely accepted faith in the self-correcting nature of the markets and the ability of financial institutions to effectively police themselves. More than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions, championed by former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and others, supported by successive administrations and Congresses, and actively pushed by the powerful financial industry at every turn, had stripped away key safeguards, which could have helped avoid catastrophe.

Figures such as current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and former SEC chair Christopher Cox are singled out for making misleading statements in 2008 about the gravity of the situation just before the crisis erupted. The report goes on to state:

Our examination revealed stunning instances of governance breakdowns and irresponsibility. You will read, among other things, about AIG senior management’s ignorance of the terms and risks of the company’s $79 billion derivatives exposure to mortgage-related securities; Fannie Mae’s quest for bigger market share, profits, and bonuses, which led it to ramp up its exposure to risky loans and securities as the housing market was peaking; and the costly surprise when Merrill Lynch’s top management realized that the company held $55 billion in “super-senior” and supposedly “super-safe” mortgage-related securities that resulted in billions of dollars in losses.

Finding that “a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency put the financial system on a collision course with crisis,” the FCIC cites the high leverage ratios at the leading investment banks and the fact that “the leverage was often hidden—in derivatives positions, in off-balance-sheet entities, and through ‘window dressing’ of financial reports available to the investing public.”

The report continues: “When the housing and mortgage markets cratered, the lack of transparency, the extraordinary debt loads, the short-term loans, and the risky assets all came home to roost. What resulted was panic. We had reaped what we had sown.” One chapter, covering the explosion of risky financial instruments such as collateralized debt obligations is entitled “The Madness.”

Perhaps most damning is the FCIC’s finding of a “systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics” that “stretched from the ground level to the corporate suites.” For example, the report cites the case of the subprime lender Countrywide (later taken over by Bank of America):

As early as September 2004, Countrywide executives recognized that many of the loans they were originating could result in “catastrophic consequences.” Less than a year later, they noted that certain high-risk loans they were making could result not only in foreclosures but also in “financial and reputational catastrophe” for the firm. But they did not stop.

All in all, the FCIC report paints an incriminating picture of the U.S. financial industry as well as the government regulators and private entities such as credit rating agencies that are supposed to put some checks on the unbridled pursuit of profit. In fact, the document in many ways reads like a criminal indictment. We would all be better off if some actual prosecutors pursued these leads.

Note: The report, dominated by a section of more than 400 pages endorsed by a majority of commissioners, also contains a 125-page dissent from the minority as well as 80 pages of endnotes. But that’s not all. The document indicates that it is not the sole repository of what the FCIC found:

A website—www.fcic.gov—will host a wealth of information beyond what could be presented here. It will contain a stockpile of materials—including documents and emails, video of the Commission’s public hearings, testimony, and supporting research—that can be studied for years to come. Much of what is footnoted in this report can be found on the website.

A critical researcher’s dream.

Using Financial Reform to Promote Deregulation

Growing public rage over Wall Street misbehavior has snapped the Senate out of its lethargy on financial reform. Amid the get-tough posturing, however, the impulse to lighten the regulatory “burden” on business has not completely disappeared.

When Senate Republicans unveiled their alternative approach to reform on April 26, buried in the document was a provision that called for less rather than more regulation. The GOP proposal would make smaller publicly traded companies exempt from a key provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbox, for short), the corporate accountability law enacted in 2002 in response to the accounting scandals at companies such as Enron and WorldCom.

The provision in question, Section 404, requires firms to maintain a system of internal controls to ensure the integrity of their financial statements, which must include an audited assessment of the adequacy of those measures. A breakdown in such controls is an invitation to financial fraud.

Senate Republicans would like to provide an immediate exemption to companies with a market capitalization of $150 million or less and would instruct the Securities and Exchange Commission to explore the possibility of setting the cutoff even higher. The SEC has already delayed implementation of the Section 404 requirement for smaller firms, and it convened a business-dominated advisory committee that recommended consideration of Sarbox relaxation for firms with market capitalization up to $787 million. The Commission, however, has refused to create a permanent exemption.

Truth be told, it is not just Republicans who are pushing the exemption idea. The financial reform bill that passed the House in December contains a Section 404 small-business exemption that was proposed – against the wishes of Financial Services Committee Chair Barney Frank – by Democrat John Adler along with Republican Scott Garrett, both of New Jersey. The amendment passed with the blessing of the Obama Administration, with White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel personally lobbying members of the Committee on its behalf. Senator Dodd, however, did not include a small-business exemption in his financial reform bill.

The Sarbox small-firm carve-out may win some friends in business circles, but it entails serious risks. Chief among them is that the exemption could serve as a stepping stone to further weakening or abolition of the entire law.

This is more than a remote possibility. Republicans make no secret of their distaste for Sarbox in general and have used this as a theme in criticizing the Dodd bill. South Carolina Senator Jim DeMint called that bill “Sarbanes-Oxley on steroids,” adding: “Like Sarbanes-Oxley, it is reactionary legislation that’s more likely to hurt U.S. businesses than reform the financial system.” A recent Wall Street Journal editorial denounced Dodd’s bill as “a souped-up version of the Sarbanes-Oxley bill of 2002 – that is, a collection of ill-understood reforms whose main achievement will be to make Wall Street even more the vassal of Washington.”

Congress is not the only arena where Sarbanes-Oxley is under assault. The U.S. Supreme Court is expected to rule soon on a challenge by the rabidly anti-regulation Competitive Enterprise Institute to the legitimacy of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which was created by Sarbox by regulate public accounting firms. Some legal observers believe that a high court ruling against the Board could lead to the demise of Sarbox in its entirety.

Even if this dark scenario does not come to pass, does it make sense to loosen the controls on smaller firms? Fraudulent behavior is hardly unknown among public companies of modest size. In fact, such companies have long been used as vehicles for criminal enterprises. A 1996 Business Week investigation found that “substantial elements of the small-cap market have been turned into a veritable Mob franchise, under the very noses of regulators and law enforcement.”

Lately, the focus has been on the sins of the financial giants, but that’s no reason to dilute oversight of smaller players. Now’s a time for tightening regulation across the board.

Getting Companies to Come Clean About Risks

In 1982 building materials producer Johns-Manville filed for bankruptcy, overwhelmed by a rising tide of lawsuits brought by workers crippled from exposure to the company’s most infamous product: asbestos insulation. The Manville litigation and Chapter 11 filing caught many investors off guard because the company, despite knowing the risks of asbestos for decades, did not disclose the potential consequences to shareholders. The episode is one of the most egregious cases of corporate irresponsibility in U.S. history.

Unfortunately, Corporate America did not learn the lesson of the asbestos debacle. Many companies—from cigarette manufacturers to investment banks involved with subprime mortgages—have failed to fully inform investors of potential liabilities. They have been able to do so, in large part, because of lax accounting rules.

That could now change. The entity that sets the rules—the Financial Accounting Standards Board—is currently working on the first modifications since 1975 to its disclosure guidelines, known as FAS Statement No. 5, regarding “loss contingencies.” The problem is that FASB is considering revisions that some advocacy groups consider too weak.

The Investor Environmental Health Network (IEHN), “a collaborative project of investment managers that tracks product toxicity issues,” has just issued an appeal for interested parties to submit comments urging FASB to adopt stricter standards for Statement No.5. The comments are due by August 8.

Specifically, the IEHN is concerned that the revision of Statement No. 5, while requiring companies to report maximum possible loss, has three significant loopholes. These would allow companies to skirt the new rules if the company claims that the risks are only remotely likely and would not be resolved within the next year, or if it claims that the disclosure would be “prejudicial.” Also, the new rules would apply only to legal liabilities, not asset impairments (such as the risk that a company’s property might be destroyed by flooding related to climate change).

As Sanford Lewis, who serves as counsel for IEHN, puts it in an e-mail message to me: “For Enron, subprime lending and asbestos, the unifying theme is that management treated these severe-impact issues as only ‘remotely likely’ to hurt their companies. Now FASB wants to make some of these ‘remotely likely’ issues discloseable, but only if the issue is expected to be resolved within a year. Yet issues such as these typically take many years, if not decades, to be resolved. Investors need to know about them now, not right before the financial catastrophe hits.” (See his video on the issue here.)

Stricter accounting rules might not prevent risky behavior on the part of corporate executives, but they would increase the odds that investors would know about those risks before it was too late to bail out—or pressure management to clean up its act.