April 2024 Archives

Antitrust in the Workplace

Seeking to end one of the last remaining forms of indentured servitude in the United States, the Federal Trade Commission has issued a final rule that would largely ban the ability of companies to prevent employees from taking a job with a competing firm. The change would remove shackles from an estimated 30 million workers.

This is a bold move by the FTC, which normally handles cases involving anti-competitive practices by individual companies and which has traditionally focused on consumer protection rather than worker rights. The agency argues that eliminating non-competition clauses will not only help workers but will indirectly benefit consumers by stimulating business formation and reducing market concentration.

There appears to be broad support for the FTC action. The agency said that, of the 26,000 comments it received on the proposed rule on non-competes issued last year, over 25,000 endorsed the change. Corporations, on the other hand, are outraged at the rule. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce issued a statement calling it “another attempt at aggressive regulatory proliferation.” The Chamber, which vowed to bring a legal challenge, also argued that the issue should be left up to the states, most of which currently allow non-competes.

Non-competition restrictions are fundamentally a form of wage suppression. Workers barred from taking a job with a rival company are in a weaker bargaining position when it comes to pay. As such, non-competes serve the same function for employers as two other anti-competitive practices: non-poaching agreements and wage-fixing arrangements.

The first of those are agreements among companies not to hire people from one another. Workers, whether or not they are subject to a non-competition agreement, are thus in effect blacklisted if they apply for a position at another firm. The Justice Department has brought several cases as criminal matters and has faced a series of setbacks in court.

Private plaintiffs’ lawyers, on the other hand, have won a few dozen settlements in civil class actions. The largest no-poach settlement occurred in 2015, when Apple, Google, Intel and Adobe Systems agreed to pay a total of $415 million to class action plaintiffs. Cases have also involved blue-collar occupations such as truck drivers and railcar assembly workers.

Wage-fixing, analogous to price-fixing, occurs when employers in a specific labor market agree not to pay wages above a certain level. DOJ has had limited success in its prosecutions in this area as well, but here too there have been some substantial civil settlements. The most significant of these have occurred in the poultry processing industry, where companies including Pilgrim’s Pride have paid over $40 million in settlements. Several other settlements, including a $60 million agreement with Perdue Farms, are awaiting final court approval. Groups of hospitals in Michigan and upstate New York have paid over $70 million to resolve allegations they conspired to depress the wages of nurses.

The FTC’s regulatory initiatives, along with these court cases, constitute an aggressive use of antitrust law to address employer abuses. They offer significant hope for reducing the severe imbalance of power between employers and workers in U.S. labor markets.

Declining Prosecution

Three attorneys at Covington & Burling recently received a letter that could be seen as the ultimate achievement of a corporate lawyer. The U.S. Justice Department wrote to inform them that, although fraud was committed by employees of their client, Proterial Cable America, no charges would be filed against the firm.

Proterial, formerly known as Hitachi Cable America, is the latest recipient of a DOJ leniency practice known as declination. The Department has frequently been criticized for its extensive use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. These arrangements allow companies involved in criminal misconduct to avoid having to enter a plea, though they must pay a penalty. DOJ holds open the possibility of an actual prosecution at a later date if the company does not change its behavior.

In a declination, prosecution is in effect taken off the table entirely. The only real consequence for the company is having to disgorge the profits it earned as a result of the fraudulent behavior. In the case of Proterial, that amount is about $15 million. This is a far cry from the amounts companies pay in deferred and non-prosecution agreements, which for firms such as Wells Fargo and Boeing have been several billion dollars.

Proterial’s fraud consisted of misrepresenting to customers that the motorcycle brake hose assemblies it sold met federal safety performance standards. The problem was not that the company failed to test the assemblies. It did the tests but lied to customers about the results, claiming that the assemblies had passed when in fact they had failed.

The Justice Department justified its declination in various ways. It said Proterial self-reported the misconduct; it cooperated with the investigation; it terminated the employees; and it agreed to the disgorgement. DOJ’s declination letter does not, however, explain how the misconduct came about—specifically, the issue of whether the employees who lied about the test results were acting at the direction of supervisors or managers.

It is difficult to believe that low-level employees would decide on their own to engage in the deception. It may very well be that they were pressured, whether explicitly or implicitly, by their bosses to do so. This is what happened, for example, at Wells Fargo, where employees facing impossible demands from managers to increase revenue resorted to the creation of bogus accounts, unbeknownst to customers.

Proterial’s parent, Hitachi Metals Ltd., does not have a spotless record. In 2014 it pled guilty and paid a $1.25 million criminal fine to the DOJ for its role in a conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids for automotive brake hoses installed in cars sold in the United States and elsewhere. This prior offense should have made the company ineligible for the declination.

Since the Biden Administration took office, the DOJ has carried out half a dozen declinations, according to a list published on the Department’s website. It is unclear how many other leniency agreements contain the additional benefit of remaining anonymous.

The DOJ seems wedded to the idea that leniency provides an effective incentive for companies to self-report misconduct, but it may also be a way for rogue companies to take themselves off the hook.

The $1 Trillion Cost of Corporate Misconduct

When you hear a reference to $1 trillion, it usually is in connection to the stock market capitalization of a handful of the largest tech companies. Yet that ten-figure number can now also be applied to what those companies and others have together paid in fines and settlements to resolve allegations of misconduct.

The total penalties documented in the Violation Tracker database for the period from 2000 through the present now surpass $1 trillion. To mark this milestone, my colleagues and I have just issued a report called The High Cost of Misconduct, which looks back at the last quarter-century of corporate crime and regulatory non-compliance.

Total payouts grew from around $7 billion per year in the early 2000s to more than $50 billion annually in recent years. This amounts to a seven-fold increase in current dollars, or a 300 percent increase in constant dollars.

The $1 trillion total could not have been reached without the massive penalties paid by companies such as Bank of America ($87 billion, mainly in connection with the toxic securities and mortgage abuses scandals of the late 2000s), BP ($36 billion, mainly from the Deepwater Horizon disaster), Wells Fargo ($27 billion, largely from the bogus accounts scandal), and Volkswagen ($26 billion, primarily from the emissions cheating scandal). There are 127 companies with penalty totals of $1 billion or more.

With these companies and many others, their totals reflect flagrant recidivism. Looking only at the more serious cases, two dozen parents have been involved in 50 or more cases in which they paid fines or settlements of $1 million or more. Bank of America has the most, with an astounding 225 such cases.

While the vast majority of the 600,000 cases in Violation Tracker are civil actions, the database contains more than 2,000 entries involving criminal charges. These account for more than 13 percent of the $1 trillion penalty total. Twenty-six parent companies have paid $1 billion or more in criminal cases, with the largest totals coming from the French bank BNP Paribas in connection with economic sanctions violations and from Purdue Pharma for its role in causing the opioid epidemic.

In many of these criminal cases, the companies were able to resolve the matter without having to plead guilty. That is because the Justice Department makes extensive use of arrangements known as deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements. These are leniency deals by which companies pay substantial penalties but avoid a criminal conviction. Violation Tracker documents more than 500 cases involving a DPA or an NPA, with total penalties of more than $50 billion.

The theory behind these leniency agreements is that companies will learn from their mistakes and clean up their conduct. Yet there have been numerous instances of companies that signed a DPA or NPA ending up embroiled in another scandal. Amazingly, some of these companies were offered another leniency agreement, thus making a mockery of the deterrence concept. Among the double-dippers are American International Group, Barclays, Boeing, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and Teva Pharmaceuticals.

The fact that penalties have reached the 10-figure level suggests that during the past quarter century we have been living through a continuous corporate crime wave. Every year, companies pay out billions of dollars for a wide range of offenses. Many large corporations are fined or enter into settlements over and over again, often for the same or similar misconduct.

Monetary penalties are meant in part to deter future transgressions, but there is no indication that is happening. Instead, the fines and settlements seem to be regarded as little more than a cost of doing business. Presumably, the profits from wrongdoing outweigh the penalties.

It is odd that amid a move to return to tougher policies to combat street crime, there is not an analogous effort to crack down on corporate crime. Instead, the Justice Department continues to employ leniency agreements that have frequently been ineffective in getting rogue companies to change their ways. The DOJ also remains reluctant to bring criminal charges against corporate executives, except in the most flagrant circumstances.

In a few cases, DOJ has experimented with different approaches, including forcing companies to exit lines of business in which they behaved illegally. Last year, for example, Teva Pharmaceuticals and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals were not only fined for scheming to fix prices of several generic drugs—they had to divest their operations relating to one of the drugs. That kind of penalty should shake up companies more than fines alone and thus should be used more frequently.

The Second Trump Administration is Open for Business

Much of the concern about a possible second Trump term has focused on what seem to be his increasingly authoritarian impulses. Yet we should also worry about old-fashioned corruption.

A glaring sign of what may coming has just appeared in the revelation that a businessman with a shady record put up the $175 million bond Trump had to pay while he appeals a civil fraud judgement in New York State. This was after Trump claimed he could not find any company willing to provide the original bond amount of $454 million and successfully begged a state appeals court to reduce the amount.

That businessman is Don Hankey, whose holdings include Knight Specialty Insurance, which provided the bond for what Hankey told the Washington Post was a “modest fee.” He claimed that the bond deal was not meant as a political statement, yet Hankey supported Trump’s claim that the case brought against him by New York Attorney General Letitia James was unwarranted.

Hankey has accumulated most of his fortune, which Forbes estimates at over $7 billion, from making subprime automobile loans via companies such as Westlake Financial, Westlake Services and Wilshire Consumer Credit. These businesses have run afoul of regulators.

In 2015 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau hit Westlake Services and Wilshire Consumer Credit with a $48 million penalty, including a fine of $4.25 million and $44.1 million in cash relief and balance reductions for customers the agency said had been subjected to illegal debt collection practices. According to the CFPB, the companies:

Pretended to call from repo companies by altering caller ID information. The companies’ debt collectors would then make explicit or implicit threats that the borrowers’ vehicles were in imminent danger of being repossessed.
Altered caller ID information so that it looked like they were calling from unrelated businesses or family members.
Explicitly and implicitly threatened to file criminal charges against consumers even when they had not decided to refer the borrowers to criminal authorities. These tactics likely misled consumers into believing they needed to make a payment urgently to avoid an investigation.
Tricked borrowers whose vehicles had been repossessed by making it appear their calls were coming from a party associated with the word Storage. During some of these calls, the companies’ debt collectors implied that the vehicles would be released if the borrowers made a partial payment on the account; however, the companies would actually only release a repossessed vehicle after a borrower paid the full amount due.
Called consumers’ employers, friends, and family members without permission and told them that consumers were delinquent on loans or facing repossession, investigation, or criminal charges.
Paid a repo company to make collections calls to consumers, even when the companies had not decided to repossess the consumers’ vehicles or the companies had no reason to believe repossession was imminent. This tactic likely misled consumers into believing that they needed to make a payment urgently to avoid repossession.

The CFPB also accused Westlake and Wilshire of violating federal consumer financial laws in their advertising, customer relations, and account servicing practices. These were said to include changing the due dates on accounts or extended loan terms without consulting consumers and giving consumers incomplete information about the true cost of their loans.

In 2016 the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office announced that Westlake Services would provide $5.7 million in relief to consumers to resolve allegations that the company charged excessive interest rates on subprime auto loans.

In 2017 Westlake Services and Wilshire Consumer Credit had to pay $760,000 to resolve a case brought by the U.S. Justice Department alleging they violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act by repossessing vehicles from members of the military without the required court orders.

Are we expected to believe that the owner of a business such as this is helping Trump solely out of the goodness of his heart? It seems a lot more likely that Hankey is currying favor with Trump in the hope of receiving future assistance from the White House in dealing with pesky regulators.

It is not difficult to imagine that Trump would use a new stint in the Oval Office for such purposes. After all, this kind of corruption was a constant theme during his first term, when special interest groups seeking presidential help could simply book an event or a block of rooms at Trump’s hotel on Pennsylvania Avenue.

What is amazing is that this kind of mischief seems to be happening again even before Trump has won the election or taken office.