A Legacy of Corruption

According to conventional economic thinking, commodity prices are governed by impersonal market forces. That’s how oil companies, for instance, are able to claim they are not to blame for soaring petroleum prices even as they rake in record profits.

What these corporations conveniently leave out of their narrative is the fact that markets can be manipulated. This reality is made abundantly clear in a multinational criminal case involving the Swiss commodity trading and mining company Glencore.

Law enforcement officials in the United States, the United Kingdom and Brazil have just announced that Glencore will plead guilty and pay more than $1 billion in penalties for a case that involves, among other things, manipulation of fuel oil prices in the United States over a period of eight years. According to the U.S. Justice Department, Glencore created phony transactions in order to effect changes in benchmark rates that benefitted the company’s trading positions. As punishment for this behavior, Glencore will pay a criminal fine of $341 million and criminal forfeiture of $144 million.

The charges against Glencore also include allegations of widespread bribery. The DOJ stated that over a decade the company violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by making more than $100 million in improper payments to government officials in Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Brazil, Venezuela, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

After using these bribes to gain improper business advantages, Glencore was said to have concealed the payments by entering into sham consulting agreements and paying inflated invoices. In other words, it falsified its own records in an effort to cover up its corruption. For these offenses, Glencore was hit with a criminal fine of $428 million and disgorgement in the amount of $272 million.

It is unclear to what extent Glencore’s market manipulation behavior affected overall fuel oil prices in the United States and what harm its bribes may have caused in those African and South American countries.

What is undeniable is that Glencore has now joined the list of large corporations whose ethics policies have turned out to be a sham. As of this writing, the company’s website still touts its code of conduct, which is spelled out in a 59-page document. It includes statements such as: “We act honestly and with integrity and are accountable for everything we do.” And: “We do not engage in corruption and we never pay bribes regardless of who we’re dealing with or what the local custom or practice is.”

It actually should come as no surprise that Glencore would fail to live up to those high-minded ideals. After all, the company was originally created by the notorious Marc Rich, who in 1983 was indicted in the United States on dozens of criminal counts relating to racketeering, income tax evasion, wire fraud, and violation of economic sanctions against Iran.

Facing the possibility of many years in prison, Rich fled the country and spent years eluding a team of U.S. marshals tasked with bringing him back to face trial. While he was a fugitive, his companies paid millions in civil penalties. Not only did Rich avoid being extradited but he received a highly controversial pardon from Bill Clinton on his last day in office.

Glencore’s dubious behavior could even be seen in its press release announcing the resolution of the criminal cases. In it, the company stated that Glencore cooperated with the investigations, whereas the DOJ release emphasized “the company’s failure to voluntarily and timely disclose the conduct to the department.” In other words, Glencore is trying to take credit for having cooperated only after it was caught. It is appropriate that the resolution of the case includes a requirement that the company retain an independent compliance monitor for three years.

The Glencore case comes on the heels of DOJ’s multi-billion-dollar resolution of a case involving the financial services company Allianz, which was accused of engaging in a massive scheme to lure pension funds into complex investments that ended up generating massive losses.

These two resolutions have not attracted a lot of attention in the U.S., where neither Allianz nor Glencore is a household name. Yet the cases are indications that the Biden DOJ may very well be making good on its promise to get tougher on corporate crime after the lax enforcement during the Trump years. I look forward to seeing the book thrown at some large domestic companies as well.

The Biden Administration’s First Corporate Crime Mega-Case

Observers of the corporate crime scene have been waiting to see when the regulators and prosecutors of the Biden Administration would announce a mega-case of the sort that had largely disappeared during the lackluster enforcement period of the Trump years. That case has arrived, and the target is not exactly a household name in the United States: the German financial services corporation Allianz.

The Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission have announced that Allianz and its investment management arm, Allianz Global Investors (AGI), will pay more than $6 billion to resolve criminal and civil allegations relating to what the SEC called a “massive fraudulent scheme.” The victims of that scheme included public employees participating in pension funds that were misled about the riskiness of complex financial products marketed by AGI. The true extent of the risk became evident during the COVID-related market volatility of 2020, when the pension funds and other investors suffered catastrophic losses.

The $6 billion settlement ranks among the 20 largest penalties recorded in Violation Tracker for the period since January 2000. More than half of those cases involve financial services corporations.

Allianz, whose Violation Tracker penalty total until now was $182 million, joins the 30 banks and other financial services companies that have each paid more than $1 billion in aggregate penalties. These include 13 European banks, among which are two from Germany: Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank.

There are a couple of encouraging aspects of the AGI case that go beyond the substantial monetary penalty. First, the SEC announced that AGI, because of its guilty plea in the DOJ case, will be disqualified from providing advisory services to US-registered investment funds for the next ten years, and will exit the business of conducting these fund services.  This contrasts with other cases in which financial services companies have avoided these sorts of consequences in criminal cases by arranging for the guilty plea to be submitted by a minor subsidiary—or by getting a waiver.

In addition, criminal charges were brought not only against the company but also against several individuals, including Gregoire Tournant, the chief investment officer of AGI. Tournant was charged with securities fraud and investment fraud as well as obstruction of justice. The latter related to allegations that Tournant and the other defendants made multiple, ultimately unsuccessful, efforts to conceal their misconduct from the SEC, including, the agency stated, “false testimony and meetings in vacant construction sites to discuss sending their assets overseas.”

The charges against Allianz were all the more appropriate in that the company’s U.S. operations have been involved in several other investor deception cases. For example, in 2004, three of its subsidiaries were fined $50 million by the SEC. Another subsidiary paid $18 million to settle a case with the New Jersey Attorney General. Yet another unit was fined $5 million by the industry regulator FINRA. Allianz’s U.S. insurance subsidiaries have also been fined numerous times by state regulators.

Let’s hope that the Allianz matter is a sign that the Biden Administration is serious about cracking down on corporate crime and that recidivists will be made to pay a significant price for their ongoing transgressions.

A New Kind of Corporate Watchdog

Large companies prone to misconduct usually have to contend with three main kinds of watchdogs: government regulators and prosecutors, class action lawyers, and activist institutional investors. These parties have, respectively, the ability to impose fines, extract settlements, and bring about policy changes through shareholder resolutions.

Now it turns out that corporations are increasingly being scrutinized in another way. According to a recent article in Law360, insurance companies are paying more attention to business conduct. This is especially the case for ESG (environmental, social and governance) practices that big firms tout as evidence that they are good corporate citizens.

Underwriters providing coverage for liability claims against directors and officers are taking a more aggressive posture in two respects. First, they want to be sure any company they insure is not behaving in a way that could hurt the financial situation of the firm or damage its reputation, either of which could lead to costly shareholder lawsuits. Second, they are taking a closer look at the ESG reporting of the companies to see whether it is accurate.

Since corporations have to stay in the good graces of their insurers if they want to maintain their coverage, this trend toward stricter risk management could have significant positive consequences. For too long, insurers took a passive position toward questionable corporate conduct. They covered claims without doing much to get clients to change that behavior.

It is especially significant that more insurers are no longer taking the statements of firms at face value. The Law360 article quotes an official at insurance broker AON as saying that when it comes to ESG, “some companies just checked the box and said they have a policy in place, but that was never implemented.”

This gets to the heart of the problem with ESG policies: they are voluntary and largely unenforceable, while outcomes are often unverifiable. This makes them attractive to corporations: they can make grandiose claims about the good they are doing, and outsiders have to take their word for it.

Insurers have come to realize, Law360 reports, that “underlying litigation risk and uncertainty will continue to grow in the absence of clear definitions and common standards and regulations applicable to ESG.”

It remains to be seen whether insurers can get companies to establish clearer definitions. It may be that ESG is inherently fuzzy and that serious standards can only come from government regulators. Yet the new posture of the insurers could help discourage the most unsubstantiated ESG claims.

Hopefully, insurers will come to see that the most valid measures of business behavior should be based on metrics assembled outside the companies themselves. That is what my colleagues and I attempt to do with Violation Tracker.

The data we collect is all from regulatory agencies and court records. We ignore the statements of corporations, including those—such as the Legal Proceedings sections of 10-K filings—in which firms are supposed to own up to their transgressions. Those disclosures are almost always incomplete.

In the end, meaningful change in corporate behavior will only come about through outside pressures, not boardroom enlightenment. If insurers are serious about contributing to those pressures, so much the better.