Over the past decade, the Securities and Exchange Commission has paid out around $2 billion to individuals who provided information that led to successful enforcement actions against rule-breaking corporations. The awards can amount to tens of millions of dollars and sometimes reach the nine-figure level. More than a dozen other federal agencies such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission have similar incentive programs.
The Justice Department recently announced that it will jump on the whistleblower bandwagon with a pilot program designed to assist in the prosecution of corporate crimes. DOJ’s initiative will cover certain crimes involving financial institutions, from traditional banks to cryptocurrency businesses; foreign corruption involving misconduct by companies; domestic corruption involving misconduct by companies; and healthcare fraud schemes involving private insurance plans.
To be eligible for an award, someone must provide DOJ with original non-public information that leads to a successful prosecution with a corporate penalty of at least $1 million. The whistleblower, who must not have participated in the illegal activity, could receive up to 30 percent of the first $100 million in net proceeds and 5 percent of proceeds between $100 million and $500 million. That means that a whistleblower could receive as much as $55 million.
Whistleblowing is not entirely new to DOJ. The department has long employed the False Claims Act qui tam program to investigate fraud against the federal government by contractors and Medicare healthcare providers. Many of the nearly 4,000 False Claims Act cases in Violation Tracker were made possible by whistleblowers. These cases are handled as civil matters, whereas the new pilot program will cover criminal charges.
DOJ sees the whistleblower program as part of its broader effort to encourage corporations to self-report when they detect illegal behavior within their ranks. The department took the unusual step of structuring the program so that whistleblowers remain eligible for an award if they first report the misconduct to corporate superiors and the company in turn discloses it to DOJ.
It would be ill-advised for the department to offer leniency deals to companies that engage in self-reporting only after learning that a whistleblower is ready to go public. Such deals are meant to incentivize companies to come forward of their own volition, not when the boom is about to be lowered.
Some critics complain that the DOJ pilot is deficient in that it does not adequately protect whistleblowers from retaliation. The program description deals with the issue by saying that the department could respond to retaliation by declining to award the company cooperation credit and/or “institute appropriate enforcement action.” DOJ would do well to adopt procedures like those in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act providing specific remedies for whistleblowers who experience retaliation.
Despite these limitations, it is encouraging that DOJ is adopting a practice for its criminal cases that has a long track record of success in bringing to light corporate wrongdoing of a civil nature. Let’s hope that this approach will put more pressure on rogue companies to clean up their act.