Financial Crisis

Back to the Barricades?

The news that Byron Dorgan and Christopher Dodd will not run for reelection has Democrats fretting that they will lose their 60-vote supermajority in the Senate and will no longer be able to get anything accomplished.

But what have we got to show, with regard to checking corporate abuses, for the past 12 months of Democratic control over the legislative branch as well as the White House? Last year this time, excitement over Obama’s election and the Democratic gains in Congress persuaded many activists that great things could once again happen in Washington. The big business agenda would supposedly no longer reign supreme, and progressives anticipated major legislative gains regarding healthcare coverage, financial regulation, the climate crisis and union organizing.

Now those expectations seem hopelessly naïve. Rather than radical changes, we’ve ended up with a disappointing series of half-measures, quarter-measures, and stalemates.

The biggest frustration is in the healthcare arena. We seem to be on the verge of getting a new system that will expand coverage and curb some of the most egregious insurance industry abuses, but these improvements come at a high cost. The final bill will likely have a strict individual mandate compelling those without coverage to become customers of a bunch of blood-suckers yet a weak employer mandate allowing many companies to avoid providing decent coverage to their workers. It will not seriously regulate insurance rates yet may end up penalizing union workers who gave up wage increases to get more generous benefits. The bill that squeaked through the Senate and is expected to form the basis of the final legislation is so compromised that veteran reformers such as Physicians for a National Health Program have called for its defeat.

After crippling the economy through reckless investments and forcing millions of homeowners into foreclosure, the big banks have largely been treated with deference by Congressional Democrats and the Obama Administration. Nothing has been done to break up institutions deemed too big to fail and thus able to extort massive taxpayer-funded bailouts. Despite loud complaints from bankers used to sumptuous pay packages, the federal government’s restrictions on executive compensation have been pretty indulgent. The bill that passed the House in December creates a new consumer protection agency for financial services, but it is unclear how much power it will have. And the bill lacks aggressive regulation of the exotic financial instruments that helped bring about the crisis. Separate legislation on credit cards that was enacted curbs some of the industry’s most outrageous practices but does nothing about usurious interest rates.

The climate bill passed by the House in June not only shunned strict emission limits in favor of the dubious cap-and-trade system, but it would allow many major polluters to avoid paying for their emission allowances for up to 20 years. And the overall emission reductions the bill envisions are far below the level needed to make a substantial dent in global warming.

And then there’s the Employee Free Choice Act, the key priority of the labor movement, which did so much to get Obama and many Democrats elected. The legislation has been in suspended animation for many months as Senate leaders apparently cannot muster enough votes to overcome intransigent opposition not only from Republicans but also from some Dems. EFCA remained stalled even after the AFL-CIO signaled it was open to compromise on the key issue of card-check organizing.

Overall, corporate interests have been remarkably successful over the past year in avoiding serious restraints on their freedom of action. Much of what the Democrats are accomplishing amounts to the appearance of reform. It gives the impression that corporate misbehavior is being addressed but is actually inoculating business against more stringent regulation. In the case of healthcare, the situation is even worse: by turning millions into captive customers, Congress is granting unprecedented power and legitimacy to a discredited industry.

There are plenty of obvious explanations for this dismal performance. It is easy to point to the corrupting effect of corporate campaign contributions and lobbying by former Congressional staffers as well as the pernicious role of conservative Democrats and egomaniacs like Joe Lieberman.

But the progressive movement also deserves some of the blame. The euphoria following the 2008 election gave rise to another bout of the delusion that serious change requires nothing more putting in office a certain number of people with the preferred party designation.

During the 1930s FDR is supposed to have told activists in a private meeting: “I agree with you, I want to do it, now make me do it.” Although that quote has showed up in several blogs over the past year, the underlying message seems to have been lost on many of today’s activists. With the absence of substantial popular pressure, it has been easier for Congressional Democrats to succumb to the siren song of the corporate interests.

Ironically, it has been the woefully ignorant and confused tea party movement—serving as a witting or unwitting stalking horse for the corporate elite—that has lately shown the power of grassroots mobilization. Their positions make no sense, but the tea baggers have made sure that Congressional Republicans maintain a hard-right stance on everything.

Perhaps we will accomplish more if we return to our own barricades.

Are Strange-Bedfellows Alliances the Way to Cut the Big Banks Down to Size?

glass-steagall-act Bipartisanship is rare these days, and rarer still are cases in which Democrats and Republicans come together to urge new restrictions on business. Yet here we have Democratic Senator Maria Cantwell of Washington joining Arizona Republican John McCain to propose a reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act. The long shot idea would turn back the clock on a key facet of ruinous financial deregulation.

In case you have forgotten, Glass-Steagall was one of the signature reforms of the New Deal era, signed into law by FDR as part of the Banking Act of 1933 (photo). Reacting to Wall Street’s excesses of the 1920s and the stock market crash, the law mandated a separation between the speculative world of investment banking and the supposedly more prudent business of commercial banking. This forced big institutions such as J.P. Morgan to spin off their securities operations, leading to the formation of firms such as Morgan Stanley.

While many credited Glass-Steagall with promoting financial stability, by the 1980s commercial banks began clamoring to get back into the more exciting (and potentially more profitable) game of underwriting corporate securities and providing other investment services. Little by little, the Federal Reserve gave in, which only emboldened the big players. In 1998 wheeler-dealer Sandy Weill directly defied Glass-Steagall by arranging a merger of Travelers Group and Citicorp, thus creating the behemoth we know today as Citigroup. What was left of Glass-Steagall was repealed by the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.

The near-meltdown of the financial system has engendered new interest in the principles that had been embodied in Glass-Steagall. McCain and Cantwell are not the only ones talking about reviving the 1930s legislation. Several progressive members of the House made a similar proposal earlier this month. The idea has also been endorsed by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker and prominent economist Joseph Stiglitz.

Glass-Steagall redux would not, by itself, solve the problems of the U.S. financial system, and it is not a substitute for wide-ranging reform. But it would put a significant crimp in the casino culture that has taken root throughout the banking world. Another advantage is that it would by necessity bring about a reduction in the size of many mega-institutions that are now considered “too big to fail” and thus must be bailed out when they screw up in a spectacular way.

The McCain-Cantwell bill, for example, would require the likes of Citigroup and Bank of America to decide within a year whether they wanted to focus on lending or securities. B of A, for instance, would have to give up its branches or its ownership of Merrill Lynch. At the same time, a purer investment bank such as Goldman Sachs could no longer pretend to be a bank holding company, the designation it adopted last year to qualify for TARP funds.

If the bill proceeds, it could also serve as the foundation for an aggressive left-right response to the financial mess. Ever since the Bush Administration and the Federal Reserve started on the road to bank bailouts last year, many progressives and many conservatives have expressed outrage at the practice but have generally talked past one another. This has helped the banks avoid having any serious strings put on their rescue packages. And it let them sidestep the most obvious solution to the problem of having financial institutions deemed too big to fail: cutting them down to size.

The biggest obstacle to restoring Glass-Steagall and otherwise curtailing the power of the big banks may turn out to be not the financial lobby but rather the Obama Administration, whose chief economist, Larry Summers, championed the final repeal of Glass-Steagall while heading the Clinton Administration Treasury Department a decade ago. Despite Obama’s recent swipe at “fat cat” bankers, he and his advisors seem to think that it’s preferable to let the financial leviathans remain in place while putting some modest restrictions on their operations.

The problem is that the giant banks have become increasingly addicted to activities such as trading — the main source of the supposed rebound in the sector — and show less and less interest in mundane matters such as lending to businesses and consumers. The Obama Administration thus comes across as a defender of aloof Big Finance while the country struggles to finance an economic rebound. The fact that progressives can find more common ground on this issue with someone like McCain suggests that strange-bedfellows alliances may accomplish more than toeing the pro-business centrist line.

Needed: A New Contract with Big Finance

banks A widely circulated rumor that Goldman Sachs executives were loading up on firearms to protect themselves against a populist uprising turned out to be spurious, but the leaders of the bank are clearly worried about rising discontent over Goldman’s prosperity amid continuing economic distress for most everyone else.

The announcement that Goldman’s top 30 executives will be denied cash bonuses this year is one of the most significant concessions Wall Street has ever made to public outrage. The members of Goldman’s management committee won’t be denied bonuses entirely but will receive them in the form of “shares at risk” – stock that cannot be sold for five years and is subject to recapture if the recipient engages in “materially improper risk analysis” or fails “sufficiently to raise concerns about risks.”

It is unclear whether these rules, which would require prudence rarely seen in the casino culture of investment banking, will be applied stringently. Goldman’s announcement that it will allow a shareholder advisory vote on compensation practices will make it a bit more difficult to flout the rules entirely.

While the ultimate impact of the Goldman move is uncertain, Britain and France are putting a real and immediate dent in bloated banker pay by imposing a 50 percent windfall tax on bonuses. Financiers in London and Paris are up in arms over the moves, with one investment banking chief telling the Financial Times that as a result of the tax the “contract between government and business is broken.”

And what exactly is that contract? As far as the financial sector is concerned, the traditional contract was that banks were expected to provide the capital needed for the “real” economy, and government did not regulate the market too strictly. A decade ago, financiers got the regulatory regime loosened even more, which in the United States meant an end to the separation between commercial banking and investment banking. The new contract seemed to be that a fully liberated financial sector would magically create wealth to make up for the travails of the productive portion of the economy.

The crisis of the past two years put an end to that notion, and the contract we’ve been left with seems to be little more than an obligation by government to prop up a teetering financial sector with bailouts and access to virtually free funding. There is no quid pro quo imposed on bankers, who are allowed to deny credit to businesses and individuals alike and use their cheap money to rack up trading profits. And those profits serve mainly to pay for outsized bonuses for the bankers themselves.

It’s always been questionable whether big finance capital served a legitimate social purpose. Now it is clear that the big banks exist mainly for the enrichment of their own executives. About half of total revenue at these banks is set aside for compensation of executives and other employees.

That’s why Bank of America and Citigroup are so eager to repay their bailout money and free themselves from the constraints of the federal pay czar. And it’s why the big banks have felt no compunction about opposing the financial regulatory reforms now before Congress.

While financial industry lobbyists twist arms behind the scenes, Goldman is playing good cop with its bonus restrictions and the quasi-apology its CEO Lloyd Blankfein issued in November. Yet neither voluntary actions by the likes of Goldman nor modest regulatory reforms are sufficient. The current “contract” between big finance and not just government but all of society needs to be rewritten, and this time we shouldn’t let bank lawyers draft the document.

CIT: R.I.P.?

cit1 When CIT Group realized it was in really big trouble, the commercial finance company apparently thought it could count on Uncle Sam to come to the rescue. About a week ago, it leaked the news that it was considering bankruptcy and waited for the Treasury Department to respond to dire warnings about the consequences for the small and medium businesses that make up most of the company’s customer base.

After all, CIT had already received $2.3 billion in TARP money last year after converting itself to a bank holding company. Other struggling TARP recipients, like Citigroup, had been able to come back for additional infusions as Tim Geithner showed himself to be a soft touch for large financial institutions.

To the surprise of CIT, it got rebuffed by the Obama Administration and will now have to file for Chapter 11 unless some deep-pocketed investors step in. CIT, with assets of about $75 billion, is a large but not a giant institution. It thus does not seem to meet the Geithner standard: it is not too big to fail.

While it is possible to understand CIT’s frustration, the company does not deserve too much sympathy. Putting size aside, there are reasons why CIT was not exactly a worthy candidate for a taxpayer handout. This is a case in which perhaps the right question to ask was whether the company in need was too flawed to save.

For decades, CIT played a useful function in the business system with services such as commercial lending, factoring and equipment leasing. But in 1980 it developed an identity crisis as it was acquired by RCA in the first of what would be a long series of ownership changes. Two decades later it came under the control of Tyco International, the shady conglomerate headed by Dennis Kozlowski, who would later be convicted of misappropriation of corporate funds and become infamous for the extravagant lifestyle–including a $6,000 shower curtain–he enjoyed with those funds.

CIT split from Tyco in 2002 and sought to make a new name for itself. Unfortunately, the way it did that was to get into two very sleazy businesses. In 2005 it entered the student loan market. Within two years, CIT’s Student Loan Xpress was being investigated by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo for paying kickbacks to university officials who steered students into predatory loans. Faced with a scandal, CIT agreed in May 2007 to sign a code of ethical conduct drawn up by Cuomo. It then booted out the president of Student Loan Xpress and later exited the business.

The other new endeavor was subprime home mortgages. For a while this dubious business boosted CIT’s earnings, but when the subprime market turned sour, the company took a big hit. In 2007–shortly after telling Investment Dealers Digest that “our subprime profile is strong”–it started posting losses and was forced to write down the value of its subprime portfolio by $765 million. It ended up leaving this field as well. CIT lost some $633 million in 2008.

CIT’s reputation was also tarnished in 2005, when it and two other leasing companies agreed to a $24 million settlement of charges brought in two dozen states about their links to the crooked telecom services company NorVergence.

In recent years, CIT has promoted itself using an advertising campaign based on the tag line Capital Redefined. Apparently, the new definition of capital is to engage in unethical business practices and then expect the federal government to come to your assistance when market conditions turn against you. Large or small, that kind of company is not worth saving.

Corporate Power is, Alas, Alive and Well

donohue Congratulations, fellow “anti-business activists.” It seems we have forced the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to commit $100 million for a campaign designed to remind Americans that they are supposed to love capitalism.

“Many union leaders, some environmentalists, and a growing force of anti-business activists are pushing governments at all levels to close trading markets, lock down capital markets, expand entitlements, and raise taxes and debt to unsustainable levels,” proclaimed the Chamber’s CEO Thomas J. Donohue (photo) recently. “We are going to activate free enterprise supporters, educate the public, and hold politicians accountable as we defend and advance economic freedom.”

After this gratuitous and somewhat puzzling swipe at activists, Donohue made it clear that the campaign’s real target is the federal government, which he suggested is preparing “an avalanche of new rules, restrictions, mandates, and taxes.” However, the events of the past year — the financial bailout, unprecedented intervention in the auto industry, a huge stimulus program, etc. — make it impossible for even Donohue to preach the laissez-faire gospel in its pure form.

“Dire economic circumstances have certainly justified some out-of-the-ordinary remedial actions by government,” Donohue acknowledged. “But enough is enough. If we don’t stop the rapidly growing influence of government over private sector activity, we will squander America’s unmatched capacity to innovate and create a standard of living and free society that are the envy of the world.”

But where is this “avalanche” of new heavy-handed federal interference? The Obama Administration has done its best to limit intervention in the private sector, despite the gravity of the economic crisis. It resisted the pressure to nationalize the likes of Citigroup and Bank of America. Obama was more aggressive in restructuring General Motors, but he insists the feds will not be involved in managing the automaker and will return it to private ownership as soon as possible.

The Administration supported efforts in Congress to curb abusive practices by credit-card companies, but the reform avoided the more radical step of capping interest rates. Along with the Democratic leadership in Congress, the Administration has rejected the single-payer solution to healthcare reform, and it is unclear whether the half-baked alternative of a public option alongside private insurers will make it into the final bill. Obama has moved to restrict but not abolish the environmentally destructive practice of mountaintop removal by major coal mining corporations. And the key demand of organized labor — the Employee Free Choice Act — appears to be stalled in the Senate.

Now comes Obama’s ballyhooed overhaul of financial regulation. The plan has some good features, such as the creation of a consumer protection agency for financial products, but overall it focuses more on rearranging the structure of the regulatory system — mainly by giving more power to the Federal Reserve — rather than truly reining in financial institutions and markets. Even the New York Times pointed out the limited nature of the reforms: “Everywhere you look in the plan, you see the same thing: additional regulations on the margin, but nothing that amounts to a true overhaul.”

Obama seemed to acknowledge that the plan was less than audacious, saying:

In these efforts, we seek a careful balance. I’ve always been a strong believer in the power of the free market. It has been and will remain the engine of America’s progress — the source of prosperity that’s unrivaled in history. I believe that jobs are best created not by government, but by businesses and entrepreneurs who are willing to take a risk on a good idea. I believe that our role is not to disparage wealth, but to expand its reach; not to stifle the market, but to strengthen its ability to unleash the creativity and innovation that still make this nation the envy of the world.

Huh? Did Donohue use part of the $100 million to bribe an Obama speechwriter to insert Chamber talking points into the President’s remarks? Or is Obama reminding us that neither he nor anyone else in official Washington intends to do anything that seriously challenges corporate power?

Calling in the Vultures

vultures Only one day after Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner told the Senate Banking Committee that the nation’s financial system is “starting to heal,” bank regulators took a step indicating that parts of the system are still festering. The FDIC announced that it had seized BankUnited, a struggling institution in Florida with assets of about $13 billion. It was the biggest bank failure this year. The collapse will cost the insurance fund about $4.9 billion.

BankUnited’s demise was expected for some time. The company’s big bet on option adjustable-rate mortgages backfired when the housing market in the Sunshine State began to shrivel. Although BankUnited avoided the subprime market, many supposedly prime customers with those option ARMs, which allow one to lower interest payments in the first years of a mortgage by adding to the principal, found themselves seriously under water and started to default.

But what’s most significant about the takeover of BankUnited is who the FDIC got to buy the bank: a private-equity group led by John Kanas, the former head of North Fork Bank, who has joined forces with prominent vulture investor Wilbur L. Ross Jr. Also involved are funds managed by the Carlyle Group and Centerbridge Partners. In other words, the FDIC delivered BankUnited’s depositors and employees into the hands of aggressive private-equity firms.

The FDIC announcement casually noted: “Due to the interest of private equity firms in the purchase of depository institutions in receivership, the FDIC has been evaluating the appropriate terms for such investments. In the near future, the FDIC will provide generally applicable policy guidance on eligibility and other terms and conditions for such investments to guide potential investors.” In other words, the FDIC realizes it is doing something risky, but it will figure out its policy after approving the deal.

Geithner previously raised the prospect of subsidizing private-equity firms and hedge funds to buy up the toxic assets held by banks. Now regulators are putting a bank itself in the hands of those wheeler-dealers.

Particularly troubling is the role of Ross, who has a long history of bottom-feeding in industries such as textiles, steel and coal. In the latter sector, his International Coal Group was the parent company of the Sago mine, where a 2006 explosion resulted in the deaths of a dozen miners. The mine had been repeatedly cited for safety violations.

The BankUnited deal could open the door to a wave of bank takeovers by private equity firms, which are not known for their enlightened management practices. If you think banks are run irresponsibly now, just wait until the vultures are in charge.

Geithner’s Cod Liver Oil

cod-liver-oil What a difference eight months make. Last fall, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson pushed through a bailout program that was seen as the salvation of the financial sector. The banks eagerly lined up to get their share of $700 billion in federal largesse with few strings attached.

These days, aid from the Treasury Department is about as welcome as the heaping spoonfuls of cod liver oil mothers used to force down the throats of their children. Large institutions such as JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley cannot wait to repay Uncle Sam. Several smaller ones have already done so. Allstate just became the second large insurer to announce that it is not interested in the insurance bailout fund reportedly being put together by the Treasury. “Given Allstate’s strong capital and liquidity positions…we will not participate in this program,” sniffed the company’s chief executive Thomas Wilson.

Bailouts are supposed to be situations in which companies come to Washington with a tin cup and plead with lawmakers to save them from obliteration. Lawmakers have to be persuaded to devote public money to rescue those suffering failure in the private market.

Somehow that has gotten completely turned on its head. We now face a situation in which the federal government is in effect pleading with large corporations to take its money, and those companies find it distasteful to do so. Getting bailed out is viewed as burden rather than deliverance. Financial policy has gone from being wrong-headed to being downright bizarre.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner does not seem to be aware of the absurdity of his position. It is unclear why he continues to push his bailout medicine on financial institutions that claim they don’t need it—claims that on the surface have more validity following the completion of the stress tests that were dubious to begin with and lost all validity after it came to light that many banks successfully negotiated for more favorable findings.

To make things worse, Treasury is, according to the New York Times, allowing those banks buying back the feds’ holdings to do so on extremely favorable terms. “Treasury accepted a lowball offer,” one analyst told the Times.

The time has come for Geithner and his boss President Obama to admit that the bailout program has become a farce. There is little evidence that it ever accomplished the stated aim of freeing up lending. Whether or not the banks really needed the assistance in the first place is something that analysts will be debating for many years to come. The auto industry portion may have provided some breathing room for General Motors and Chrysler, but now it’s become clear that the real plan is to increase imports from low-wage countries such as China.

Let’s wrap up this botched flirtation with state capitalism and focus on rebuilding an effective system of financial regulation. Some investigations and prosecutions of those who caused the mess in the first place would also be welcome.

Stress Relief

dont_worry_clock Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner kicked off his big day with the publication of an op-ed in the New York Times asserting that the Obama Administration has brought a “forceful response” to the “damaged financial system” it faced upon taking office. “We chose a strategy to lift the fog of uncertainty over bank balance sheets,” he added, and “help ensure that the major banks, individually and collectively, had the capital to continue lending even in a worse than expected recession.”

Then why does the announcement of the results of the stress tests applied to 19 large financial institutions by federal banking regulators seem to create an even denser fog of confusion? You only had to look at the differences between the front-page headlines in the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal to see the absence of a coherent story line from Geithner, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and other top officials.

BANKS NEED AT LEAST $65 BILLION IN CAPITAL blared the Journal in reporting the somewhat inaccurate information that had been leaked to it, while the Post presented its leaks with a more upbeat STRESS TEST FINDS STRENGTH IN BANKS. Following the release of the actual results late Thursday, the Post website was going with STRESS TESTS FIND BANKS NEED $75B IN EQUITY, while the Journal cranked up the alarm level with FED SEES UP TO $599 BILLION IN LOSSES.

The divergence in headlines reflects the contradictory messages that the Treasury and the Fed began feeding the public last fall and that have continued under the new administration. We’ve been whipsawed between the idea that there was a pressing banking crisis that required urgent aid from taxpayers and the notion that things were not so bad as to justify a federal takeover of the ailing institutions.

Bernanke continued the equivocation with his statement: “The results released today should provide considerable comfort to investors and the public. The examiners found that nearly all the banks that were evaluated have enough Tier 1 capital to absorb the higher losses envisioned under the hypothetical adverse scenario. Roughly half the firms, though, need to enhance their capital structure to put greater emphasis on common equity, which provides institutions the best protection during periods of stress.”

Given that the report tries hard to make the “adverse scenario” against which the banks were tested seem like a remote possibility, it is significant that nine of the institutions were deemed to have sufficient capital for such an eventuality. Ten did not. Bank of America is said to require an additional $33.9 billion in capital, Wells Fargo $13.7 billion, GMAC $11.5 billion, Citibank $5.5 billion and Morgan Stanley $1.8 billion. Five regional banks need to raise a total of $8.2 billion. These numbers suggest substantial relative weakness, yet Bernanke counsels us to feel comfortable, and many mainstream observers seem inclined to take that advice.

Geithner and Bernanke’s “don’t worry, be happy” approach seems designed to lull the financial markets while making the case for additional use of taxpayer funds to prop up some of the banks. It also serves to blunt any calls for nationalization.

If anything, the case for federal takeover of institutions such as Bank of America is stronger than ever in light of the stress test results. One way that BofA and others are expected to improve the quality of their balance sheets is to convert the preferred stock that the federal government received in exchange for its capital infusions into common stock, thus making the feds a more dominant shareholder.

Rather than seeing this as an opportunity to influence bank business practices, the feds will maintain a largely hands-off stance, according to the Financial Times. So we will continue to have a double standard between the activist approach adopted by the Obama Administration with regard to the auto industry and its unwillingness to challenge the banking elite, for whom the stress tests turned out to be a form of stress relief.

The Partial Coup d’Etat at Bank of America

bofa Bank of America seems to be in a state of denial about the partial coup d’etat that was just carried out by the company’s shareholders, who took the remarkable step of ousting Ken Lewis from the chairman’s job. BofA put out a press release with the vague title “Bank of America Announces Results from Annual Meeting” that never mentions the demotion of Lewis, who was kept on as chief executive. It simply announces that non-executive director Dr Walter E. Massey, president emeritus of Morehouse College, had been selected for the chairman’s post.

Moreover, as of this writing, the About page on the BofA website contains a box headlined Leadership with a quote from Lewis, who is still identified as chairman. The quote reads: “Bank of America helps build strong communities by creating opportunities for people — including customers, shareholders and associates — to fulfill their dreams.”

As I described in my previous post, Lewis spent four decades at BofA and its predecessor companies fulfilling his dream — or more strictly, that of his mentor Hugh McColl — of conquering a long list of competitors and creating a financial leviathan that today has the dubious distinction of being deemed to be too big to fail. Now his personal part of that dream is crumbling before him.

As hard as BofA’s p.r. people may try to downplay it, the company’s investors have just presented Lewis with a resounding vote of no confidence. Although the attempt to kick Lewis off the board entirely did not succeed, his loss of the chairmanship is a humiliating defeat and may make it untenable for him to remain in the CEO post.

What was a sad day for Ken Lewis was a remarkable victory for shareholder activism and a serious setback for those top financial executives who seem to think they can avoid any personal consequences from mismanagaging their banks to the point that they need to be propped up with vast sums of taxpayer money. The uprising of the BofA shareholders should also send a strong message to the largest owner of large banks — the federal government — that the time has come to get tough with the banking barons.

The Many Sins of Ken Lewis

lewis It always helps to put a face on one’s adversary in a protest campaign, and whether he likes it or not, Kenneth Lewis’s mug has become the lightning rod for criticism of the ongoing bailout of Big Finance. This post is being written on the eve of the most challenging day in Lewis’s 40 years as a banker. There is a chance that the shareholders of Bank of America, where Lewis has been chairman and chief executive since 2001, will oust him from the board or take away his chairmanship.

Lewis’s scalp is being sought by many. The Service Employees International Union, which has made removal of Lewis the centerpiece of its “Bad for America” campaign against BofA, this week joined forces with Moveon.org to press the issue. Major institutional investors such as the California public pension funds CALPERS and CALSTRS announced they had voted their millions of shares against Lewis. Muckraking filmmaker Robert Greenwald issued a video to further the crusade.

Those calling for Lewis’s ouster have mainly been focusing on his recent misdeeds: his still unclear role in the takeover of failing Merrill Lynch and the fat bonuses received by Merrill employees just before that deal took effect; his decision to jack up interest rates on credit card accounts; and BofA’s role in corporate organizing against the Employee Free Choice Act.

Yet Lewis has a lot more to answer for. In fact, his entire career, which has been spent exclusively at BofA and its predecessor companies, symbolizes what has gone wrong with the U.S. banking system over the past three decades.

When Lewis graduated from Georgia State University in 1969, he went straight to work as a credit analyst for a regional financial institution called North Carolina National Bank (NCNB). He rose through the ranks and eventually came to the attention of Hugh McColl, a brash ex-Marine who took over as chief executive of NCNB in 1983 and set out to transform the bank.

McColl launched an aggressive campaign to become a financial superpower. Taking advantage of the weakening of longstanding restrictions on interstate banking, he engineered a series of takeovers, first in Florida and then among big players in Texas crippled by the 1980s real estate meltdown in the Lone Star State. In 1989 McColl was rebuffed in his attempt to acquire Citizens and Southern, Georgia’s largest bank, which instead merged with Virginia-based Sovran Financial.

Two years later, after C&S/Sovran was hit with a sharp increase in its volume of bad loans, the combined company could not resist a new takeover effort by McColl. The deal turned NCNB into one of the country’s most powerful “superregional” banks, an achievement that McColl celebrated by grandiosely changing his company’s name to NationsBank.

As McColl made his various conquests during the 1980s, it was usually Ken Lewis who was sent in as a viceroy to run the newly acquired institution and integrate it into McColl’s empire. As Fortune once put it, “Lewis achieved stardom in the late 1980s and early 1990s by parachuting in to impose consistent sales and expense practices on the hodgepodge of banks that NCNB was acquiring.”

By 1993 Lewis was president of NationsBank and McColl’s heir apparent as the two men continued their relentless consolidation drive, which culminated in the 1998 purchase of California’s Bank of America and the adoption of its name. Three years later, McColl stepped down and Lewis took the reins, using them to carry out what was widely seen as a reckless deal to acquire Boston’s Fleet Bank.

BofA also got itself involved in a series of scandals—such as the one involving the Italian company Parmalat—which seemed to be an outgrowth of a need by the behemoth bank to increase revenues any way possible. It was later tied to the misdeeds of the major corporate villains of the early 2000s, paying, for example, $69 million to settle a lawsuit over its role as an underwriter for Enron and $460 million to settle an action brought by investors in WorldCom. The controversies continue into the present, not to mention the dubious business practices that would force taxpayers to provide $35 billion in capital infusions.

The history of BofA over these past few decades, including Lewis’s own trajectory, epitomizes the dangerous consolidation of power and spread of venality that have overtaken much of the banking industry. Removing Lewis would not be a matter of slaughtering a sacrificial lamb but rather a long overdue move against one of those most responsible for the financial mess we are in.